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Abstract What makes employees adopt a particular innovation, practice, or idea?
And what makes it more likely for adoption to spread wide in an organization? This
paper presents an agent-based model that simulates interactions among employees
to analyze the spread of bandwagons. Agents are subject to conformity and peer
pressure as well as to a two-level organizational hierarchy. In the model, perceptions
of the surrounding environment depend on individual cognitive attitudes (or ‘tol-
erance’ to bandwagons), the level of ambiguity attached to social relationships, and
organization size. Findings show that the probability of widespread diffusion (i.e.,
bandwagon) is dependent more on organizational size, conformity, and interactions
than ambiguity and individual attitudes.
Keywords Bandwagon  Cultural conformity  Organizational culture  Social
relationships  Collective mindlessness  Agent-based model
1 Introduction
Much of the literature on diffusion processes focuses on the adoption of innovation
among a population of organizations (e.g., Maienhofer and Finholt 2001; Rosenkopf
and Abrahamson 1999). These studies use a significant array of different analytical
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to differential equations (e.g., Abrahamson and Rosenkopf 1997; Green 2004;
Strang and Tuma 1993; Valente 1996). Conditions under which something is
adopted are often the focus of the analysis (Rogers 2003). Some studies provide a
range of theoretical tools to better understand procedures, conditions, and
determinants under which an idea or a practice spreads in a social community
(e.g., Strang and Tuma 1993), why this happens at a given point in time (e.g.,
Rogers 2003; Rosenkopf and Abrahamson 1999), and how it evolves (e.g., Chiang
2007). The study of diffusion processes within organizations is overlooked in the
literature although its understanding may bring organizations to prevent potentially
damaging ideas and practices from spreading, and/or facilitate the adoption of
effective procedures, ideas, and behaviors. This is the case, for example, of
employees discarding ethical issues when they arise, of the rise of discriminatory
practices, of the acceptance of illegal or de-motivational practices in a subsidiary of
a large multinational, or of the spread of ineffective analytical diagnostic practices
among workers of a consultancy firm. The diffusion process is usually referred to as
‘bandwagon’ when the tendency of individuals and organizations to adopt a
technique, innovation, behavior, idea, process, or attitude is a function of what the
sheer number of peers is doing (Abrahamson and Rosenkopf 1993, 1997; Rosenkopf
and Abrahamson 1999). The study of bandwagons in organizational contexts aims at
defining the conditions under which the organization’s management can achieve a
better understanding of organizational dynamics, thus limiting the spread of
potentially damaging practices, ideas, processes, or else.
This study examines how bandwagon-like processes emerge and diffuse. First, it
addresses the overlooked interaction between (a) individual attitudes towards
adoption and (b) organizational culture, relationships, and other elements of an
organization’s social structure. Second, the study of bandwagons as they happen
within organizations requires modeling efforts that are tied specifically to
organizational behavior (e.g., Fiol and O’Connor 2003), such as the analysis of
how practices, routines, habits, and ideas spread. Third, the paper uses an agent-
based model (ABM) to analyze bandwagons. ABMs are particularly useful to
simulate complex phenomena where emergent patterns are likely to manifest from
agent interactions (Drogoul and Ferber 1994; Gilbert 2008; Goldstone and Janssen
2005; Secchi 2015b). The use of agent-based computational models is on the rise in
organization studies (Anderson et al. 1999; Axelrod and Cohen 1999; Carley 2009;
Carley and Svoboda 1996; Levinthal 1997; Miller et al. 2012; Miller and Lin 2010;
Siggelkow and Rivkin 2005) but, as far as our knowledge is concerned, ABM is
used here for the first time to study intra-organizational bandwagons. Fourth,
bandwagon processes are modeled as passive cognitive mechanisms that are
explained using the distributed cognition paradigm (Hutchins 1995) and equated to
passive versions of what Simon called ‘docility’ (1993)—i.e., the attitude to make
decisions based on recommendations, advice, and information coming from social
channels.
Computer simulations are not new to the study of bandwagons and diffusion
processes (especially diffusion of innovation, see, Kiesling et al. 2012). For
example, Abrahamson and Rosenkopf (1997) studied the impact of social networks
structure on bandwagon-like processes and found that structural idiosyncrasies
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facilitate the spread of information and affect bandwagon significantly. Another
example is Chiang (2007), who designed two computational experiments to address
agents’ heterogeneous attitudes to join the bandwagon (i.e., thresholds; Abrahamson
and Rosenkopf 1997; Maienhofer and Finholt 2001) showing that their distribution
amongst neighboring agents affects adoption and the shape of diffusion. Most of the
simulation studies emphasize the impact that the diffusion process has for structural
or macro aspects of the system. The current research takes a different approach in
that it studies bandwagons as they emerge from interactions of autonomous agents.
It models actor characteristics such as threshold levels, imitation biases, social
relationships, in line with environmental characteristics such as organizational size
and organizational culture, to observe and analyze under what circumstances a
bandwagon is more likely to emerge.
In the following sections we provide a rationale for the study, then explain the
model, present simulation results, and introduce propositions that may be tested in
future works.
2 Rationale and theoretical perspective
2.1 A brief definition of bandwagon processes
There are four conceptual elements used in the literature to characterize the
bandwagon as a diffusion process. They are (a) the different kinds of pressures (e.g.,
social, psychological), (b) the main actor (i.e., individuals or organizations), (c) the
sheer number of adopters otherwise labelled ‘‘popularity,’’ and (d) the process.
These elements are reviewed briefly below with the objective to provide the reader
with a better understanding of how the bandwagon is interpreted in the present
study. At the same time, this allows us to outline the constituents on which our
model is based.
2.1.1 Pressure
This can be described as the conditioning and influence that external variables put
on potential adopters so that they feel compelled, and sometimes forced, to adopt
the practice, behavior, idea, technology, or else (Abrahamson and Rosenkopf 1993;
David and Strang 2006; Fiol and O’Connor 2003). This element has been framed in
terms of social pressure that materializes when decision makers feel required to
adopt because of ‘‘price, perceived efficiency, or legitimacy’’ (Abrahamson and
Rosenkopf 1997, p. 293). Other pressures can come from competition, where
companies may feel obliged to adopt because all other firms in the same industry
have already adopted (Rosenkopf and Abrahamson 1999).
2.1.2 Actors
The second element usually associated with bandwagons is the characterization of
the principal actor. The decision maker can be an individual (e.g., Banerjee 1992;
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Corneo and Jeanne 1997; van Herpen et al. 2009; Strang and Macy 2001; Terlaak
and King 2007), an organization (e.g., Abrahamson and Rosenkopf 1993; Angst
et al. 2010; Xia et al. 2008), or a mix of both (e.g., Abrahamson and Rosenkopf
1997; David and Strang 2006; Staw and Epstein 2000). Adoption can be based on a
rational evaluation of its advantages and disadvantages (Rosenkopf and Abraham-
son 1999) or on more trivial and less conscious evaluations (Fiol and O’Connor
2003). In a study on fashion, Esposito (2011) argues that in the case of the spread of
something fashionable rational choice becomes something close to the ‘‘rationality
of irrational’’ (p. 604).
2.1.3 Popularity
Another element is that a bandwagon is usually defined through popularity, i.e.
potential adopters are triggered by the number of people that already adopted (e.g.,
Angst et al. 2010; Pangarkar 2000; Pangarkar and Klein 1998; Staw and Epstein
2000). The number of those that are already in the bandwagon is sometimes referred
to as the sheer number of peers (Angst et al. 2010; Pangarkar and Klein 1998) to
highlight the fact that there should be some similarities among actors that are
exposed (and join) a given practice, idea, or behavior (Strang and Meyer 1993; Burt
1987). This does not imply that diffusion is conditional on the fact that people (or
organizations) exposed should be similar in status and/or other characteristics, but
the presence of similarities would boost the number of adoptions.
2.1.4 Process
This leads us to the last, but not least, element used to define bandwagons: the fact
that it is often studied as a process (Abrahamson and Rosenkopf 1993, 1997; Fiol
and O’Connor 2003; Pangarkar 2000). This aspect is usually implicit in most of the
research and puts the bandwagon dependent on time. One of the consequences of
adding time to the process is that the timing of adoption is sometimes crucial to fully
understand how it spreads (Abrahamson and Rosenkopf 1997; Rogers 2003). Less
studied, but still important, is to understand the timing of the adopted practice, idea,
behavior fading out and disappearing (David and Strang 2006). It is worth noting
that some authors refer to the process and its consequences as the bandwagon effect
(Corneo and Jeanne 1997; Chiang 2007; Granovetter 1978; van Herpen et al. 2009;
Leibenstein 1950; Rohlfs 2003).
It is interesting to notice that popularity may be related to the degree of pressure
that potential adopters perceive. However, this is not always the case; pressure is the
interpretation that an actor makes of a popular phenomenon, given environmental
constraints. This means that a phenomenon can be popular although the pressure on
actors to adopt is relatively low (i.e., there are little/no repercussions for non
adopting). This would be the case of buying a certain brand of pasta at the
supermarket while it is certainly not the case when it comes to choose which school
is good for your kids. Given these four elements, for the purpose of the present study
we refer to a bandwagon as a process of diffusion of an idea, behavior, process,
practice, or any imitable characteristic amongst individuals who adopt it because of
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its increasing popularity. In the following we detail how elements of this definition
are interpreted in the making of the model.
2.2 The organizational being
The underlying assumptions on decision makers involved in a diffusion process
have varied over the years depending on the literature (Rosenkopf and Abrahamson
1999). We maintain that all actors operating in an organization, whether they are
employees or managers, are subject to bounded rationality (March and Simon 1958;
Simon 1955, 1997). This connection to bounded rationality can be seen as somehow
implicit in the studies reviewed above. We address this shortcoming and attempt to
make it more apparent. In the face of bandwagon processes, this reflects on at least
two issues.
First, bounded rationality has been indicated as one of the factors affecting
organizational learning (March 1991), and used to justify biased judgment
(Bazerman 1994; Kahneman 2003; Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Mostly to
overcome the limits of bounded rationality, Simon suggested that individuals are
‘docile’ (Simon 1993, 1997). This is the attitude to lean on recommendations,
advice, and information coming from social channels while making decisions
(Knudsen 2003; Simon 1993). It is a safety net for human cognition that tries and
finds resources outside of one’s brain to make appropriate or workable decisions
(Bardone 2011). When docility is described this way, it then becomes very close to
those approaches to cognition that claim it is distributed (e.g., Clark 2003, 2008;
Hutchins 1995). According to these perspectives cognition is not limited to one’s
brain but it can only be understood and analyzed in connection with the external
tools used to facilitate the process itself (Clark and Chalmers 1998; Hutchins 1991).
Among these external resources are other human beings, i.e., ‘social’ or
‘organizational’ resources (Michel 2007). This approach to cognition can be
interpreted as an extension of bounded rationality (Gavetti et al. 2007; Secchi 2011)
and it seems to explain some of the mechanisms underneath bandwagons.
Second, some scholars (Abrahamson 1991, 1996; Fiol and O’Connor 2003) point
out that bandwagons happen when individuals are not using their cognitive
capabilities to their fullest extent. Mindlessness (Langer 1989) is often used to
describe this status and has been defined as the individual switching to an ‘automatic
pilot’ to indicate that there are low degrees of determination and presence (Langer
1989; Levinthal and Rerup 2006; Weick et al. 1999). A great deal of attention has
been channeled through the study of how managers maintain a vigilant and active
status of mind, thus avoiding phenomena such as bandwagons (e.g., Fiol and
O’Connor 2003; Levinthal and Rerup 2006).
Following this line of thinking, with bandwagons there is a mindless use of
external social resources that makes it not sound (i.e., a fallacy, Woods 2004). We
suggest this happens when these otherwise powerful cognitive mechanisms are used
‘‘passively,’’ via simple observation of what others are doing. The idea of the
bandwagon as a passive process refers to the fact that there is no need for the
individual to assess the idea, thought, behavior, or anything that is adopted. The
only assessment made is that the adoption is spreading all around. When the attitude
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towards docility is particularly low—meaning it is mostly passive—, there may be
that individuals are only passively getting information from social channels and
their decision making remains somehow mechanical (March 1978, 1994; Miller
et al. 2012). We are postulating that this characteristic of the individual (i.e.,
docility) varies in its intensity (Thomsen 2015) depending on contextual and
internal elements and it assumes high or low values (Secchi 2015a; Secchi and
Bardone 2009). Low docility is mostly characterized by passive attitudes rather than
interaction and exchange of information—i.e., a mix of passive and active—because
this is a so-called survival condition, where someone needs information from others
to make his/her way in the organization. However, the individual is not particularly
attuned to the ways communication is handled in the organization or does not feel
she/he can trust the others (Ossola 2013). As docility levels rise, we can observe
more interaction and a sort of ‘‘giving back.’’ The more value the individual
provides to others when giving back information—i.e., active docility—the higher
the standards of the interactions (Secchi and Bardone 2009).
The active-passive mechanism in docile attitudes is one and cannot be easily
split. However, the active needs the passive to be carried out. Providing information
to social channels means that this information is meaningful to those who receive it.
The meaningful effort of sharing information with others implies that some
information has been gathered at the same time or before the time of sharing. Take
the example of a new hire. This individual does not know much about social
dynamics in the group/department/division or organization. He/she does not know
much about the jargon or the formalities of communicating with others. He/she does
not have a sense of community and his/her identity is not tied to the group/
department/division or organization, yet. For these reasons, there may be active-
passive docile interactions—and useful ones, if the new hire has a genuine
willingness to learn and get accepted by the group/department/division—but the
new hire will find it relatively difficult to tune in and find the right channels for
communicating. Some individuals never find these ‘‘right’’ channels and some
organizations do not favor ‘‘active’’ docile behavior, being more preoccupied of
preserving the facade of communication (this is an aspect of what Argyris called
‘‘defensive routines,’’ Argyris 1986, 2004). In different words, listening is a key
(passive) element of docile individuals, and the more advanced active docility
builds on it.
Threshold models of bandwagons have been particularly popular so far (Chiang
2007; Strang and Meyer 1993; Strang and Soule 1998) because they are relatively
easy to deal with and bring immediate descriptive and normative results. This study
provides a particular interpretation of individual thresholds in that they lean on
docility and distributed cognition. Individual characteristics are modeled as attitudes
towards adoption of something that is popular in the organization at a given point in
time. Given the assumptions above, when individuals have a particularly low level
of docility—which means there is a mindless attitude and scarce exploitation of
distributed cognitive mechanisms—then their threshold level is also low, i.e. they
are more likely to adopt if a relatively low number of individuals have already
joined. When docility is high, a corresponding mindfulness and a high potential to
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exploit distributed cognitive mechanisms, then the threshold level is high, i.e.
individuals are less likely to adopt blindly.
Everything described so far does not happen in vacuum. One of the character-
istics of the organizational environment is that it provides the conditions for
individual interactions. Some of these conditions are more likely to affect the
emergence of bandwagons. This study analyzes which organizational characteristics
lead individuals with different levels of docility (or thresholds, as defined above) to
join the bandwagon. According to the literature, these conditions may be referred
back to (a) organizational culture, (b) hierarchy, (c) ambiguity, and (d) proximity.
The sociology-based literature on diffusion has emphasized the role of culture
(Strang and Meyer 1993; Strang and Soule 1998) in the adoption of innovation or
any other practice, thought, behavior, or else. In particular, it has been argued that
the degree of formalization affects the progress of a diffusion process (Burns and
Stalker 1961; Strang and Soule 1998). This may be also relevant for hierarchical
levels and how role models or leaders (e.g., Bandura 1977; Gibson 2003) may affect
the diffusion process (Abrahamson and Rosenkopf 1997). In addition to this, some
scholars have pointed out that higher degrees of ambiguity—defined as a condition
where either one or all amongst the range of alternatives, outcomes, and
probabilities are unclear (Rosenkopf and Abrahamson 1999)—affect the likelihood
of adoption of new ideas (Carley 1995). Lastly, spatial proximity becomes relevant
when what is going to be diffused is intellectually cheap (Strang and Soule 1998).
As some of the simulation and modeling literature suggests, ABMs are one of the
most appropriate tools available to bring together these aspects at the individual
level as well as the broader environmental conditions (e.g., Carley 2009; Drogoul
and Ferber 1994; Fioretti 2013; Gilbert 2008; Gilbert and Terna 2000; Goldstone
and Janssen 2005; Kiesling et al. 2012; Meyer et al. 2011; Miller et al. 2012; Miller
and Lin 2010). In the following, we describe how these elements are modeled, how
the data is derived and analyzed, then implications are discussed.
3 Model specification
Models and computer simulation of social systems always face a trade-off between
simplicity and realism (Coen 2009a, b; Lave and March 1975). One of the reasons
why many social scientists have embraced ABMs is their ability to model
complexity in social systems even with a relatively limited number of parameters
(Van Dam et al. 2013; Fioretti 2013). The purpose of the simulation is to unveil how
the organization’s social structure and individual characteristics affect and are
affected by bandwagons. Agents are modeled so that their perception of the
organization is given by both their location in the three-dimensional space and their
threshold levels (i.e., active or passive docility and ability to exploit distributed
cognition mechanisms). In the following, we detail how agents (employees) and
environments (organizations) are created in the model. Table 1 provides a summary
of conditions and parameter specifications.
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3.1 Employees
Every agent (employee or manager) is defined with its unique characteristics and
this gives it a distinctive view of the world. This not only implies that every agent is
different but that also their perception of what happens around them is slightly
different from their peers. The model characterizes each agent using random or
pseudo-random (as defined in Miller 2015) techniques and rules of attribution. In the
following, we detail how this is achieved.
In our model, each and every individual has a threshold level t—i.e., the degree
the agent can tolerate to adopt or not to adopt (Abrahamson and Rosenkopf 1997;
Granovetter 1978)—that is initially assigned to each agent on the basis of a random-
normal distribution tDðl; rÞ.1 The mean l is given by the total number of
employees in a given organization, N, multiplied by a discount factor, a (0.25), and
r is defined as N  0:6a. These values for the distribution were set up after several
trial runs of the simulation to preserve enough variability among employees. Too
many low values would have led to the spread of bandwagons whereas too many
high values would have led to very little occurrences. When thresholds are anchored
to the total number of employees in an organization, it means that their initial
allocation is a function of the social system in which agents operate. This is to say
1 We use the letter D to indicate the normal distribution so that it does not conflict with our use of the
letter N to indicate sample size.




Number of employees in a given organization
Ambiguity On/off When switched on, ambiguity is modeled as random movement of all
agents, with (socially) ‘close’ ones moving together
Management On/off When switched on, managers are 10 % of the total number of individuals




4, 5, 6 The area in which individuals interact with their peers and with
management (if this condition is prompted)
K 0, 0.1, 0.5, 1 Conformity as an aspect of organizational culture; values close to 0
indicate poor conformity whereas values close to 1 indicate high levels
of conformity for agents in the organization
k Dð0:5; 0:25Þ Docility attitudes of the agent that is allocated to each agent at time
T ¼ 0; it leads the process of adaptation for individual thresholds due
to internal and external conditions (i.e., position, peers, individual
threshold level). All values below 0 and above 1 are respectively 0 and
1
a 0.25 Threshold constant used to allocate individual characteristics as initial
conditions
ta Dðl;rÞ Threshold of agents; l is given by the total number of employees in a
given organization, N, times the threshold constant, a, and r is defined
as N times 0:6  a
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that the attitude towards joining the latest trend in the use of a particular financial
indicator, for example, has to depend on conditions of the organization where this
trend occurs. The simulation takes the total number of employees in an organization
as the upper abstract reference point on which to allocate thresholds. It serves as the
anchor on which any social phenomenon within the organization happens. It is
important to notice that thresholds are allocated as general attitudinal mechanisms
that are tied to the organization but they are activated by the particular conditions
each agent is exposed to. Written differently, the mechanism of threshold allocation
is ‘general’ while the way it is activated is ‘local.’ This has two implications. First,
thresholds can be higher than the total number of peers, but they are anchored to that
number. This allows us to make the so-called ‘‘snob effects’’ (Leibenstein 1950)—
i.e. individuals that would never join the bandwagon because they move the
opposite way the crowd moves (the opposite of the bandwagon effect)—possible
although highly improbable. It also allows us to simulate individuals who would
join the bandwagon independent of circumstances around them; again, this is
possible but highly improbable. Second, employees’ behavior is also anchored to
what happens in the organization, to what management and their peers do and think,
and to what surrounds them. This both defines the organization as context of shared
meaning among its participants and is consistent with previous uses of ABM in the
field (e.g., Miller and Lin 2010). These initial thresholds are the starting point for
each simulation run. Agents thresholds adapt and vary as the simulation goes on to
mimic social dynamics with a logic that is fully explained below.
A second characteristic of each agent is set by their docility, k (Simon 1993).
Each agent has a different attitude that is assigned using a random-normal
distribution kDð0:5; 0:25Þ. This allows agents to be more or less prone to see
other agents as source of useful information, i.e. of exploiting social channels as
resources for their cognition (Secchi 2011; Clark 2004). However, we implemented
this mechanism in the model (see Eqs. 1 and 2 below) to mimic a passive attitude
towards gathering information more than re-distributing it (Secchi and Bardone
2009; Secchi 2011). The lower the value of k is, the more likely it is that agents take
whatever is coming from the environment and align to it, thus increasing the
probability of joining the bandwagon. Instead, agents with higher levels of docility
k are less likely to join the bandwagon. This operates as a changing mechanism to
the agent’s threshold, as detailed in the equations below. This resembles low
k individuals to the unintelligent docile and high k as intelligent docile of a model
proposed by Simon (1993). To model this particular aspect of bounded rationality
on the ABM, we reviewed some of the existing attempts available in the literature
(in particular, Dal Forno and Merlone 2002; Miller and Lin 2010).
Another feature of the agent is that each one of them has a limited perspective on
the organization. Each agent can only observe and deal with a limited number of
peers on a parameter that is the same for every agent/employee and that is labeled
proximity or v (Strang and Soule 1998) and can be framed as one of the aspects of
bounded rationality. The parameter does not indicate the number of peers every
agent interacts with but it sets an area of interaction in the organizational space.
Given the random allocation of agents in the organizational space, this allows for
variability in the number of peers each agent interacts with. The values of this
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parameter are v [4, 5, 6] (Table 1). From pilot tests of the model we found that for
numbers greater than 6, the likelihood of a bandwagon becomes very high,
therefore, this study does not take them into consideration. On the other hand, for
proximity lower than 4, there is an insufficient number of relationships and
(especially when N 200) it is very unlikely that a bandwagon emerges. A spin-off
effect of these parameter values it that the model sets the conditions for ambiguity
over how, and under what circumstances, bandwagons may emerge or not.
The parameter vicinity is better understood in relation to the set of conditions for
ambiguity (Carley 1995; Rosenkopf and Abrahamson 1999). This is facilitated by
employees positioning in the three-dimensional organizational space is random and
takes the form of ðxi; yi; ziÞ where i is the i-th agent. In addition to that, and to
reiterate ambiguous conditions as time goes by, agents move on the three-
dimensional space. Their movements are rather limited and are based on an
algorithm (Fruchterman and Reingold 1991)—that is one of the standard options for
movement available in NetLogo, the software we used—that brings agents away
from their initial random position, with a force that is partially repulsive to each
other and partially attractive to the mutual relationship established. This mechanism
is done to mimic how individuals interact dynamically with both the environment
and their peers (Gilbert and Terna 2000).
Given its importance in this model, ambiguity needs to be specified further. We
defined it above as a condition where either one or all amongst the range of
alternatives, outcomes, and probabilities are unclear (Rosenkopf and Abrahamson
1999) but we believe this only points at general conditions that have to be met
and lacks of specificity. A way to tie ambiguity to the organizational context can
be found in Cohen and March (1974, Ch. 9) as it relates to goals/tasks, perception,
and power. In the model, agents do not see the whole range of alternatives, i.e.
what is happening in the entire organization, because their location is determined
by what is in their immediate range of action. This implies that the agent has
some difficulties to forecast what is about to happen at time t1, because this
depends on its location, interactions, and observations of others. A bandwagon can
be thought of as an ambiguous task/goal, since there is no statement of why it is
there for, nor to what extent it is going to benefit the individual or the
organization. Individual conditions are relative to the agent’s perception of the
organizational environment and of the relations with other surrounding agents.
This setting adds more uncertainty to the fact that the goal/task (i.e., bandwagon)
is not specific nor clear in its formulation, hence contributing to add ambiguity
(Cohen and March 1974). Finally, there is also ambiguity related to power, and
that comes in with the introduction of hierarchical levels (what we call
‘management’ in the simulation). If the agent-employee gets in contact with an
agent-manager, the movement of its threshold is significantly influenced by that of
the agent-manager. The reasons for this effect are not necessarily rational and can
be due to the ambiguity that power exercises to others. The responsibility of
which (Cohen and March 1974) discuss and that comes with power derives from
this fundamental ambiguity. Others (employees) may take what comes from
management without thinking too much, hence taking their attitudes towards
bandwagons as something that may eventually lead others to align.
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This stylized view of ambiguity (of tasks, perception, and power) is obtained in
the simulation with the random allocation and smooth movements in the three-
dimensional space. These movements contribute to make interactions uncertain in
such a way that every step of the simulation can bring something new so that what
happens at time t1 is hard for the agent (and the observer) to forecast when at time
t0. There are two conditions in the simulation, one where ambiguity is high and
another where it is low. In the latter case, agents are allowed to move smoothly
around the three-dimensional space although they can establish relations with others
(in the form of links). In the former condition, agents are connected to each other
(based on proximity), they do not move around, and tend to interact with each other
for the time of the simulation. The first case is more unpredictable and agents are
subject to more extemporaneous interactions, hence making the perception of
goals/tasks as well as the relation with hierarchical power more uncertain. The
second case mimics a more stable (probably formal) environment where relation-
ships are more certain and there is a clearer perception of the goal or task that is
implicitly represented by a bandwagon.
3.2 Organizations
We model organizations on a three-dimensional space where employees and
managers interact. The position in the space is supposed to be more the opportunity
that agents have to interact and this opportunity may be caused by the fact that
simulated employees work together in a department or that they are more likely to
get along. This resembles a socio-cognitive vicinity rather than a physical
proximity.
Structure is defined by a two-layer hierarchy, with employees on the one hand
and managers on the other. Managers are set at 10 % of the total number of agents
in the system and have characteristics that are similar to employees. The only
difference is that their impact on employees’ threshold—from time 1 on—is much
higher, when they are in range of proximity. If that is the case, then the threshold of
employees takes the form
te;Tþ1 ¼ te;T  K  ðte;T  tm;T ;vÞ; ð1Þ
where te;Tþ1 is the threshold of an employee at time T þ 1, te;T is the value of the
threshold at time T, K is a value for culture (more on this below), and tm;T ;v is the
average of managers’ thresholds at time T in the radius v. Managers have higher
likelihood of affecting other employees that get in contact with them, with a factor
that is proportional to the number of links with employees (see below). The char-
acteristics of the individual together with their position in the organization—figu-
ratively indicated by their location and hierarchical level—can be considered as
elements of bounded rationality (Carley et al. 1998; Carley and Newell 1994).
Moreover, we acknowledge that management thinking or behavior may have a
stronger impact on employees compared to that of peers, due to position, leadership,
line of command.
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Social relationships among agents are represented by a link, a connection, that
becomes apparent between two or more agents that are in the radius v. This is done
for each employee and for each manager. The result is that, given the random initial
location on the organizational space and the semi-random movement of each agent,
new links may appear at every step. These represent working, personal, or any other
kind of relationship amongst employees in the organization. These links spread over
co-workers and managers and do not break until the end of the simulation. New
links can be added under the high ambiguity condition while there is no change
under the low ambiguity condition.
The parameter K identifies one aspect of organizational cultural identity that is
particularly close to bandwagons. This can take four values (0, 0.1, 0.5, and 1) and it
is a measure of conformity, where 0 is no conformity and 1 is complete conformity.
The parameter impacts on individual thresholds in a way similar to what already
shown above in the case for management. When social relationships are in place,
then the threshold of employees modifies according to the following algorithm
te;Tþ1 ¼ te;T  ðK=2Þ  ðte;T  te;T ;vÞ ð2Þ
where te;Tþ1 is employee’s threshold at time T þ 1 and te;T is employee’s threshold
at time T, K is the conformity factor, te;T ;v is the average of thresholds of sur-
rounding employees that are in the v radius at time T. When this cultural ‘‘rule’’ is
down to zero then individuals only lean on their docility attitudes k. This means that
an initial value for docility kDð0:50; 0:25Þ, substitutes organizational cultural
conformity K in the equations. When organizations are subjected to the rule of
cultural conformity then the effect of docility can be thought of as implicitly
reflected on the threshold distributions. Instead, when there is no clear cultural
conformity rule in the organization, individual docility plays an independent role on
the agents, affecting thresholds more explicitly. The former case reflects a more
formal while the latter a more informal social structure (Scott 2003). Both condi-
tions (k and K) fill in the given initial threshold level depending on position, social
relationships with peers, hierarchical relation with management, and personal atti-
tudes. A key study for the modeling of culture in computer simulation is that of
Axelrod (1997); our approach to modeling culture in ABMs has taken some hints
from that pioneering study. In summary, while Eq. (1) refers to the way employee
thresholds change in the presence of management, Eq. (2) is the more general rule
for threshold change, given different levels of cultural conformity (or docility, when
this is down to zero).
When management is contemplated in the simulation, we do not specify that
there is a ‘‘direction’’ in the diffusion of bandwagons, we only postulate that there is
some sort of organizational ‘‘contagion’’ that operates through thresholds that
modify according to proximity of agents. The only specification we give to the
agents is that, when one of the surrounding agents is a manager, then its influence is
greater than that coming from non-managers. Hence, while we do not necessarily
indicate a point of origination for the bandwagon (whether it is from management or
employees) we do acknowledge the likelihood that something coming from
management is more likely to spread. On the one hand and to some extent, this
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means that there is a higher likelihood that management-originated bandwagons
have better chances to spread. On the other hand, this means that we do not preclude
that employee-originated bandwagons would not spread or would spread less
effectively. In fact, these employee-originated bandwagons can spread all around,
independent of the type of agents. As specified above, the threshold level for each
agent is originally attributed using a random-normal distribution and this means that
a manager as well as an employee may start the simulation being ‘‘in the
bandwagon’’ already. Management thresholds adapt following the same rules of the
agent-employees. The bottom up ‘‘permeability’’ of management allows for the
emergence of autonomous trends within organizations, in the sense of (Burgelman
1983a, b) and the simulation aims at reflecting these occurrences.2 Of course, we do
not know whether these phenomena—that we call bandwagons in this paper—have
further impacts on organizational strategy, but it is likely that some would, once
acknowledged and taken on board by managers.
The simulation works at a high level of abstraction in the sense that we do not
specify what is being adopted (what diffuses) within the organization but we
postulate that it is a phenomenon that represents the characteristics of a mindless
bandwagon.
Organizational size is modeled as the number of agents (employees) included in a
given round of the simulation. This number is N [100, 200, 500, 1000] (Table 1),
and identifies small, small mid-sized, large mid-sized, and large organizations.
Bandwagons emerge as a function of agent thresholds. The initial number of agents
that adopted a given practice, idea, innovation, behavior are the initiators of what
may become a trend or a widespread adoption (Rogers 2003). These individuals
have been randomly attributed threshold of 0. In the simulated organizational space,
these agents take the red color as opposed to ‘regular’ agents that are green colored.
At every step, a bandwagon spreads if the threshold for each agent is lower than the
proportion (percentage) or red-colored agents in the surroundings.
Finally, it is worth noting that organization size is stable over the entire period of
the simulation. This means that the number of employees in a given organization
does not change for the entire time of the simulation. In practice, this can be
interpreted as absence of hiring or firing in the period considered. However, this
does not mean that agents in the simulated organization have all the same
experience or that they react to treatment conditions the same way. For example,
agents with particularly low level of cultural conformity can be thought of
representing mostly new hires—i.e., employees who are not yet acquainted with the
organization’s social structure, even if a given Person-Organization fit (Edwards
2008) was high at the time of hiring. At the same time, newcomers are more likely
to show the attitude to lean on others to make decisions. To say it differently, they
are probably more lenient on their passive docility attitudes and tend to take other
people’s recommendations, suggestions, advice. Cultural conformity and docility
together—one affecting the bandwagon negatively and the other positively—
probably indicate what is the state of new hires in the organizations considered in
the simulation. It is interesting to notice that we do not have a clear linear effect
2 We thank one of the anonymous reviewers for this intuition.
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here, but a complex set of two parameters that operate on thresholds to identify the
probability that a new hire would join the bandwagon.
3.3 Simulation procedures
The simulation was performed plotting agents on a three-dimensional area and have
them move according to a given time scale. Every run of the simulation is obtained
having one only parameter change its value, all other parameters being equal. This
allows to mimic experimental design and to unveil the effect of each parameter on
to the spread of bandwagons. From Table 1 it becomes apparent that data from the
ABM follows a factorial design of 2 2 3 4 4.
The procedure to determine how many runs were needed is based on power
analysis (Cohen 1988, 1992; Hallahan and Rosenthal 1996), adapted from (Ritter
et al. 2011). The range of power levels that are considered acceptable for
simulations is  :90 (Ritter et al. 2011) and some authors indicate 0.99 as the
ultimate threshold (Secchi 2014). Simulation runs in our model stop automatically
whenever the number of agents joining the bandwagon is more than 90 % of the
total organizational population or when time t ¼ 300.3 For the first round of
simulation, every run (r) have been repeated 50 times. The model produced
9600ð50 192Þ bandwagon procedures with the parameters settings defined above,
for a total of 32 days 19 h and 33 min of computational machine-time. The total
machine-time for the process tended to be expensive for higher values of the
parameters. Therefore, to compute the optimal number of runs—required to avoid
Type II error—, we required that all runs met the basic 0.90 criteria. For example,
for the run defined by N ¼ 100, v ¼ 4, K ¼ 0:1, no hierarchy (i.e., management
switched to ‘off’), and low ambiguity (i.e., switched to ‘off’ position), we performed
a power analysis for one-way ANOVA, to check runs needed to unveil differences
among covariates. Overall, with the experiment design set at 50 runs, 300 steps per
each parameter configuration, derived the effect size, and set a ¼ 0:05, power
ranged between 0.98 and 0.99. This means that the simulation model is clearly
beyond 0.90 and close enough to the upper end of 0.99, making Type II error
unlikely to occur.
In compiling the information above and specifying results of this model, we have
attempted to cover as many aspects as possible of the adapted Overview, Design
concepts and Details (ODD) protocol (Polhill et al. 2008; Polhill 2010) and to the
broader systematic Design of Experiments (DOE) (Lorscheid et al. 2012).
4 Analyses and results
The model and its procedures were implemented using NetLogo 3D 4.1.3, an open
source software for simulations of artificial societies (Wilensky 1999). We compiled
the code to run this software using an incremental, trial and error approach. That is,
we ran several pilot tests that were used to improve the initial programming and the
3 We harmonized time to fit 100 scale—x axis—in all the figures.
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model before running the one presented in this paper. Pilot-testing took approx-
imately 1 year; the final model is available, together with codes and software
specifications, on the online platform ‘‘OpenABM’’ (https://www.openabm.org/
model/4716/version/1, Secchi 2015c).
Data is coded 1 or 0 for each time period if the agent either joined the bandwagon
or not. This information is then weighted on the basis of how many agents joined as
compared to the total number of individuals ‘at risk.’ The procedure let the data
assume a configuration that appears to be suitable for survival analysis (Selvin
2008), consistent with some existing models on diffusion (Strang and Meyer 1993;
Strang and Macy 2001; Strang and Tuma 1993).
Results are analyzed using cumulative events plots, equal to the reverse of
survival curves (i.e., 1 SðtÞ). Robustness checks were conducted running Cox
proportional-hazards regression models (Cox 1972); results are reported in the
‘‘Appendix’’. The cumulative events curves are plotted below and show the
probability an employee would join the bandwagon over time (Selvin 2008). The
probability 1  SðtÞ is related to the cumulative hazard rate in so that
SðtÞ ¼ expðHðtÞÞ. While results of the Cox regressions (Appendix) show how
different values of a given parameter increase or decrease the likelihood of
bandwagons presenting relative proportional coefficients, cumulative events curves
unveil the probability that an employee would join bandwagons and how these
probabilities (curves) evolve over time. The difference is that in the regression the
initial benchmark is not given (in fact it is set to 1.00) while the plots provide a map
of all conditions. We believe it is more intuitive to look at cumulative events curves
to show how strong is the effect of parameters on the probability of employees to
join the bandwagon. As the curve goes up and reaches the value of 1, it is more
likely that individuals will be part of the bandwagon (i.e., they won’t stay immune
to bandwagons). Every curve starts at value 0 and time 0 (Sðt0Þ ¼ 0) and changes
over time given the conditions described above.
In a more operational fashion, a bandwagon effect is usually identified by an
s-shaped curve (e.g., Rosenkopf and Abrahamson 1999) that defines a non-linear
diffusion process within the organization. There are several ways of operational-
izing the idealized bandwagon curve and we refer to a function of thresholds that
can be represented by p ¼ ðu=NÞq, where p is the probability to join the bandwagon
at a given time, equivalent to 1 SðtÞ, u varies with time as well u(t) and it is the
number of individuals that join the bandwagon, N is the total number of individuals
in the system, and q is a parameter for the distribution of thresholds (the curvature)
(Chiang 2007). This curve may take from more to less skewed distributions. While
analyzing results from our simulation, we consider a curve to be representative of a
bandwagon if it can be expressed using a function similar to the one reported above:
it is not linear, and carries on at least 50 % of the population, i.e. 1 SðtÞ 0:50.
Computations are made using an estimate of all simulation runs for each
condition, all other parameters being equal. Hence figures below follow an
incremental logic, going from the smallest to the largest number of conditions. This
allows us to isolate the impact of a parameter relative to all conditions. Survival data
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are analyzed using the survival package for R, version 2.15.3, a computational
statistics software (R Development Core Team 2012).
4.1 Cultural conformity and proximity
We started our analysis with the simplest combination of parameters. Figure 1
shows the impact of very low (K ¼ 0:1), middle (K ¼ 0:5), and high (K ¼ 1)
cultural conformity rule given the range of interactions (v[4, 5, 6]) on different
organizational sizes. Figure 1a presents probability curves for the small organization
and shows that their variation is below 10 %. This means that a bandwagon is
unlikely to materialize when organizations have a limited number of employees,
independent of proximity and cultural conformity. There is a slight increase when
employees are given the opportunity to interact more (v ¼ 6) and when there is
higher cultural conformity (K ¼ 1). However, no bandwagon can be detected.
The smallest of the two mid-sized organizations (N ¼ 200) does not differ from
the small organization. Figure 1b shows that there is a slight variation among
conditions here although the probability to join the bandwagon is never more than
40 %. As employees make clearer steps towards conformity to organizational
culture (K ¼ 1), probability to adopt similar practices, behaviors, or ideas increases.
Also, wider opportunities to establish relationships (v[5, 6]) bring to a larger
variation of probabilities due to the impact of cultural conformity. This is consistent
to the fact that more interactions among individuals increase the likelihood that
exchanges of information (and of any other kind) happen and diffuse. However, it is
hard to see proper bandwagons (i.e., s-shaped curves) from Fig. 1b.
Under the same conditions analyzed above, increasing the number of employees
to N ¼ 500 and to N ¼ 1000 leads to different results. First, unlike previous
findings, Fig. 1c, d show curves that spread over the full range of probabilities.
Second, when cultural conformity is low (K ¼ 0:1), probabilities to join the
bandwagon are lower as potential relationships among employees are higher
(v ¼ 6). The mechanism behind this result is simply the multiplication effect
(amplification) that culture has on larger organization. It is somehow expected that
weaker cultures have limited impact on imitative behaviors such as bandwagons.
The largest organization type (N ¼ 1000) is more likely to show bandwagon-like
behavior when cultural conformity is stronger (K ¼ 1). Bandwagons spread more
quickly when the range of interactions is wider (v ¼ 6) and Fig. 1d shows that high
cultural conformity (K ¼ 1) cuts in half the time needed for the bandwagon to
spread as opposed to the time needed with mid-range conformity (K ¼ 0:5).
Similarly, Fig. 1c shows that there is higher probability for employees of a large
mid-sized organization (N ¼ 500) to join the bandwagon when conformity is in its
mid-range (K ¼ 0:5). The probability reaches 80 % when the opportunity of
interactions is higher (v[5, 6]) and time  90. The probability is also higher than
60 % for higher levels of conformity (K ¼ 1) and it remains constant after time 50
when opportunities of interactions are greater (v ¼ 6). In this particular case, there is
a sudden increase of bandwagons, with a stable equilibrium reached in the
organization after time 50. A mid-range cultural conformity parameter (K ¼ 0:5)
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Fig. 1 Probability to join the bandwagon under conformity K and proximity v
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leads to similar results in both types of organizations with a slightly faster
occurrence for the larger organization (Fig. 1d).
The simulation shows that there probably is a cutoff size for organizations, where
the bandwagon becomes dependent on conformity and employee range of
interaction as the number of employees grows. The environment of the simulation
(i.e., the organizational space) is the same in the four cases. This is done to mimic
the fact that larger organizations are relatively more crowded than the smaller. Thus
employees are more likely to observe and/or meet colleagues. Interestingly enough,
different conditions (K and v) in differently-sized organizations still lead to similar
results of no-occurrence when cultural conformity is in the mid- and in the low
range (K[0.1, 0.5]) and can be seen from Fig. 1. Instead, there are quite significant
and varying effects when we compare the high cultural conformity rule across
organizational sizes.
4.2 The effect of ambiguity
Surprisingly, adding ambiguity brings limited change to the patterns as far as most
conditions are concerned (Fig. 2). In particular, both the the small (N ¼ 100) and
the smallest mid-sized organization (N ¼ 200) do not seem to be affected by high
levels of ambiguity. Although there is no pattern that leads to bandwagon-like
phenomena, for higher cultural conformity and range of proximity (i.e., K[0.5, 1]
and v ¼ 6) the probability at time 100 increases slightly with high ambiguity (over
15 % and over 40 %; Fig. 2a, b) as compared to low ambiguity (Fig. 1a, b). Most of
the other conditions bear very similar effects to those of parameters under low
ambiguity.
Figure 2c shows that bandwagons spread in the second mid-sized organization
(N ¼ 500) only with the highest cultural conformity (K ¼ 1) and highest range of
interactions (v ¼ 6). There is a 60 % probability for the milder condition (K ¼ 0:5
Fig. 1 continued
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Fig. 2 Probability to join the bandwagon under conformity K, proximity v, ambiguity
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and v ¼ 5) while all the other conditions are on or around 40 %. Figure 1d for the
largest organization (N ¼ 1000) shows, on average, higher probabilities. However,
high ambiguity seem to decrease the probability to join the bandwagon or make
agents take slightly more time to join. What seems to be constant across conditions
is that lower cultural conformity and limited range of interactions (K ¼ 0:1 and
v ¼ 4) bear no effect on bandwagons.
The high ambiguity condition is obtained having agents semi-randomly float in
the organization space on an attractive-repulsive algorithm. This way, it is
impossible for simulated employees to know ex ante how their environment looks
like as they get ready to the following step of the simulation. Figure 2 shows that
this condition decreases the likelihood of bandwagons instead of increasing it. The
previous conditions (Fig. 1) see agents/employees interacting with the same agents
since the beginning of the simulation and to its end. In the high ambiguity setting,
agents start with a selection of other agents just like in the low ambiguity condition.
The difference is that the interactions increase its number due to movement. It is
worth noting that agents’ characteristics are allocated randomly at the beginning of
the run and they only change through interactions. The equation shown above
allows agents to adapt their threshold to what happens around them. When
interactions are stable and with the same simulated employees, there is a group
effect that is equated to individuals that align themselves to the group. If
relationships increase then group dynamics change and individual thresholds adapt
to the new set of interactions.
4.3 Management impact on bandwagons
Figures 3 and 4 present the probabilities that employees join the bandwagon given a
two-layered hierarchy in the organization, respectively with low and high
ambiguity. The two figures can be considered as add-on to the ones presented above.
Fig. 2 continued
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Fig. 3 Probability to join the bandwagon under conformity K, proximity v, and hierarchy
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Overall, the impact of management is that of decreasing the likelihood of
bandwagons. Figure 3a, b show that small organizations (N ¼ 100 and N ¼ 200) are
less likely to see employees joining bandwagons. Most of them remain ‘‘immune’’
to the phenomenon, with probabilities always below 15 and 25 % for, respectively,
the smallest and the small mid-sized organizations.
The other two larger organizations show a different distribution of probabilities
when compared to the absence of hierarchy. First, the distribution is different over
time. In both cases, it takes more time for bandwagons to spread. In other words, the
probability reaches 60 % and above for large mid-sized organizations (N ¼ 500)
and 80 % and above for large organizations (N ¼ 1000) only at time 100. The effect
of hierarchy on bandwagons is that it takes more time to spread. In the one case
shown in Fig. 3d, there is a constant and continuous increase in the probabilities,
pictured in a curve that seems drawn on the diagonal of the plot (K ¼ 1 and v ¼ 6).
The presence of a two-layer hierarchy decreases the probability that workers join the
bandwagon at any given time when we compare Fig. 3 with Fig. 1. However, in the
case of larger organizations the outcome seems to be more consistent across
conditions in that the structure would, around time 100, make it more likely for
ideas, practices, and anything else to spread over the entire organization. Another
element that we should consider when management is introduced in the large
organization (N ¼ 1000) comes from the low cultural conformity parameter
(K ¼ 0:1; Fig. 3d). The final probability at time 100 for each condition of proximity
(v[4, 5, 6]) is always higher than what observed in absence of management, i.e.
Fig. 1d.
The mechanism that explains the effect of management is due to the fact that
simulated employees recognize hierarchy. This element affects threshold levels as
employees establish relationships with management and peers. In larger organiza-
tions this different factor related to management does not eliminate the ‘‘risks’’ of
bandwagons to spread but, as results show, it slows its pace. This process seems to
Fig. 3 continued
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Fig. 4 Probability to join the bandwagon under conformity K, proximity v, hierarchy, and ambiguity
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mimic the presence of departments, teams, or divisions within a given company.
Although we do not provide a detailed account of what happens to these micro-
clusters within larger organizations, we can confidently state that they look similar
to what was recorded in smaller organizations.
Figure 4 presents findings for a two-layer hierarchical structure in presence of
high ambiguity. The probability to join the bandwagon for the two smaller
organizations (N ¼ 100 and N ¼ 200) are shown in Fig. 4a, b. These results are
very similar to those found in Fig. 3a, b, the only difference being that differences
amongst all conditions can be visualized more easily by looking at the figures.
However, probabilities are well below 50 % hence there is limited evidence that the
phenomenon would occur.
More interesting results appear in Fig. 4c, d for the two larger organizations
(N ¼ 500 and N ¼ 1000). Contrary to what shown in the other conditions for large
mid-sized organizations (N ¼ 500), probabilities are all below 50 % for all
conditions when management is introduced in the model. This points at the fact that
the presence of management (even if limited to a two-layer hierarchy) prevents
bandwagons from spreading. When cultural conformity is in its mid-range
(K ¼ 0:5), Fig. 4c shows that probabilities reach their highest (i.e., above 40 %).
Management has a similar effect in larger organizations. Due to the number of
agents and to the conditions described above for large organizations (N ¼ 1000), the
probabilities that appear in Fig. 4d are higher than those of the other organization
sizes. There is a steady growth for high cultural conformity (K ¼ 1) and higher
range of relationships (v ¼ 6) until the curve reaches around 55 %, where the
system seems to reach an equilibrium. There still is a higher probability for
bandwagons to emerge for mild and low cultural conformity (K[0.5, 0.1]) and
limited range of interactions (v[4, 5]). The mechanisms that explains the curves’
behavior is the same for large and for large mid-sized organizations. When
information from the environment is extremely ambiguous then management seem
Fig. 4 continued
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Fig. 5 Probability to join the bandwagon under docility k, proximity v, and hierarchy
112 D. Secchi, N. L. Gullekson
123
to serve as a boundary for bandwagons, especially as range of interactions increases.
Management is a sort of ‘‘filter’’ used to stabilize organizations when the
opportunity to establish relationships is broader and there is a diverse flow of
information. Ambiguity and low-range interactions make the role of management a
bit more difficult. However, in all conditions, it takes the whole time frame (i.e.,
T ¼ 100) for probabilities to reach a level that actually triggers a bandwagon.
4.4 The surge of passive docility
The next step in the simulation is to check what happens to the four organizations
when there is no cultural conformity (K ¼ 0) and individuals are left to interact with
each other based on their own cognitive characteristics. This may be representative
of start-up organizations, or organizations facing an intense crisis, for example.
Agents were modeled with ‘‘passive docility’’ attitudes. This is the tendency to take
information from others, without engagement or exchange. It is rather different from
the active or passive-active mechanism. The assumption here is that a bandwagon is
more likely to emerge when employees use passive distributed cognitive mecha-
nisms, i.e. when they don’t think of what they are doing (i.e., they are mindless; Fiol
and O’Connor 2003). A passive attitude would be, for example, to observe peers’
behavior and imitate that behavior.
Curves are drawn slightly differently to show these findings since there is no
cultural conformity K. Figures 5 and 6 show probability curves for different degrees
of proximity (v[4, 5, 6]) and for the presence of management as well as for its
absence. As already done above, the second set of figures—i.e., Fig. 6a–d—adds
high ambiguity to the mix.
From Fig. 5 it is possible to highlight two findings that apply to all organization
sizes. One is that the impact of management either reduces the probability of
bandwagons or it decreases its pace. Another finding is that the absence of any
Fig. 5 continued
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Fig. 6 Probability to join the bandwagon under docility k, proximity v, hierarchy, and ambiguity
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cultural conformity norm in the organization does increase the likelihood that
passive docile cognitive mechanisms have an impact on bandwagons. All
probability curves are, on average, hitting higher percentages than those shown in
Figs. 1, 2, 3 and 4. The small organization (N ¼ 100) in the simulation shows levels
of probability for all conditions that are below the bandwagon threshold (i.e., below
50 %). Similarly to what shown above, under most conditions (v[4, 5, 6])
probabilities are on or below 20 %. The only exception is for the highest range
of interaction (v ¼ 6) without a clear management structure. In this latter case the
probability goes up to 40 % at time 100.
A different picture comes from Fig. 5b. The small mid-sized organization
(N ¼ 200) is more subject to bandwagon effects when there is no hierarchy and for
higher ranges of interaction (v[5, 6]). Probabilities get close to 80 % as time
approaches the limit for this simulation (T ¼ 100). When a limited range of
interactions is allowed (v ¼ 4), then bandwagons are always unlikely to happen
(probability 50%). With the presence of management, bandwagons may occur
only when interactions increase (i.e., v 5).
Curves from Fig. 5c, d show similar patterns although the size of the two
organizations represented is different, one being double the size of the other.
Although with different timing, all conditions bring towards high probability of
bandwagons, i.e. on or above 80 %. As already noted above, this happens quickly
for structures with no formal management and for the larger organization type
(N ¼ 1000). Interestingly enough, the impact of management for large organiza-
tions (with v ¼ 6) is very similar to what found with a high cultural conformity
norm (K ¼ 1; Fig. 3d). This aspect is particularly interesting in that it points at the
fact that the impact of management to curb bandwagons is particularly relevant for
large organizations. If we take 80 % as a threshold for bandwagons to spread, we
may then observe that large mid-sized organizations (N ¼ 500) reach that
probability when time is up to 100. Again, management has a strong impact to
control, monitor, or simply slow down a given bandwagon effect.
Fig. 6 continued
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At a first look, Fig. 6 reveals that modeling a more ambiguous environment for
the simulated employee does not dramatically change the probabilities for the
phenomenon to occur. However, a closer look at the curves shows that ambiguity
increases slightly the probabilities and the pace of bandwagon. For all organization
sizes, we have that probabilities are higher for low ranges of interactions (v[4, 5]).
The impact of a two-layer hierarchy contributes to slowing the pace of bandwagons,
and it shows effects similar to those of the conditions analyzed above.
There are little changes for the small organization (N ¼ 100) besides a slight
increase of probabilities to join the bandwagon. All curves remain below 50 % with
only one getting close to that limit (v ¼ 6 with no hierarchy). Findings are different
for the small mid-sized organization (N ¼ 200) in that most conditions reach or go
beyond 50 % at the time limit (T ¼ 100). This makes the bandwagon plausible even
though still unlikely to occur when interactions are limited (v ¼ 4) and there is a
formal hierarchy in place. The picture is different for large organizations. Figure 6c,
d present probability curves for large size organizations (N ¼ 500 and N ¼ 1000).
In both cases, ambiguity makes bandwagons extremely likely to occur, and
increasingly so as we go along the time line. Still, there is an impact of management
although probabilities hit 80 % sooner or later down the given time frame. Under all
conditions at time 100, these probabilities approach 100 % for large organizations
(N ¼ 1000) and 90 % for large mid-sized organizations (N ¼ 500). When there is
no clear organizational cultural reference (or conformity), ambiguity leads large
organizations to show higher probabilities for bandwagons to emerge. This may be
enough to unveil what seems a stable finding in the analysis.
5 Discussion
This paper presents an agent-based computer simulation with the objective to study
what, amongst employee and organizational characteristics, facilitates or hinders the
emergence of bandwagons. Findings from the simulation only partly align with
previous research. This section elaborates on results, derives theoretical implica-
tions, and outlines indications for future research. We derive propositions to better
outline these implications and to help future research.
5.1 Redefining threshold attributes
One of the interesting features of this model is that we assume that individual
thresholds are not given and static (e.g., Granovetter 1978) but they adapt to the
surrounding social environment. In other studies (Abrahamson and Rosenkopf 1997;
Rosenkopf and Abrahamson 1999), threshold models characterize the bandwagon
itself as an adaptation strategy, since it shows conformity to peers. However, this
tendency to conform may vary with time and social pressure (Angst et al. 2010;
Strang and Soule 1998). For this reason, our model is a dynamic threshold model,
where individual attitudes are a function of the self, co-workers, and manager
attitudes. Put differently, there is an individual attitude towards joining the
bandwagon that modifies itself with increasing opportunities for social relationships
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(v), organizational culture (K), hierarchy (managers), ambiguity, threshold levels
(te), and docility attitudes (k). The final (behavioral) adaptation—i.e. to join the
bandwagon—may be the result of some internal change in individual attitudes,
perceptions, or thinking on that idea, practice, behavior, or something else that is
being adopted. This brings the socio-cognitive perspective in. The model includes
this aspect of the working environment and structures it into a cultural element
(Strang and Meyer 1993) and a personal socio-cognitive factor (Bardone 2011;
Kunda 1999; Michel 2007). The latter is more or less what we just described here
while the former can be labeled as a pre-condition to finding common ways to
understand each other. Of course, we are just stating that culture constitutes the
sharing of values, rules, practices, and beliefs (e.g., Schein 1990, 1996; Scott et al.
2003), and it is not a homogenizing factor per se. However, even those cultures that
push towards heterogeneity and diversity start from something that people share to
make communication easier and more effective (Strang and Meyer 1993). This is
the particular facet of culture that is in the model and that results show it is linked to
how bandwagons spread in an organization. Again, what this study does is to model
individual attitudes (e.g., thresholds, docility) as dynamic so that they depend on
other organizational variables and on interactions amongst employees.
Proposition 1 The initial distribution of thresholds affects the spread of
bandwagons less than adaptation due to cultural conformity and docility.
5.2 The mixed effects of management
In this study, organizational structure has a very narrow meaning. It is just the
presence of a two-layer hierarchy among workers. In fact, we make a distinction
between managers and employees. Threshold levels vary depending on individuals
interacting with each other and the distinction between managers and employees
helps the model consider aspects such as leadership, role models (e.g., Bandura
1977; Gibson 2003), and other similar factors that power, position, legitimacy, and
authority bring to the workplace (Angst et al. 2010). These can all be reframed as a
mix of variables Xi that contribute to explain the role of management in curbing
bandwagons.
In almost every condition (with some differences and exceptions discussed
below) the presence of managers decreases the likelihood of bandwagons (Figs. 3, 4,
5, 6). This effect is larger when there is no cultural conformity (Figs. 5, 6) and
slightly larger under high ambiguity (Fig. 6). In every case, the introduction of
management brings the probability of bandwagons down especially when a cultural
conformity rule is not given. This means that there is a regulating mechanism that
structure brings in, especially in larger organizations, where it seems that
management has a crucial role in limiting the pace at which bandwagons spread
in the organization. These may be the cases of organizations that have been quickly
set up or recently founded, where culture (conformity) is yet to emerge. In these
cases, creation of a hierarchical structure among workers helps reducing mindless
behavior by introducing power, responsibility, and authority. The following
proposition seems to fit well with what we are stating:
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Proposition 2 Managers can decrease the spread of bandwagons when ambiguity
is low and cultural conformity is weak. The effect is larger as organization size
increases.
However, there are some nuances in the way management affects the emergence
of bandwagons in large organizations (N ¼ 1000). When there is a cultural
conformity rule in place and under high ambiguity, larger sized organizations do not
benefit much from the presence of management. This statement is counterintuitive
but, in a scenario of cultural conformity, a behavioral structure is already in place
and some of it may be more relevant to employees than just hierarchy.
It is worth noting that the effect of management becomes scarce or almost
irrelevant in the case of smaller organizations and it increases the likelihood of
bandwagons for larger organizations (Figs. 3d, 4d) when a cultural conformity rule
is assumed and proximity is low (v ¼ 0:1) as opposed to other conditions (Figs. 1d,
2d). In large organizations, most agent-employees will adopt sooner or later even if
cultural conformity is not particularly high (i.e., K[0.1, 0.5]), when management is
in place. With no hierarchy, the same conditions either fall short of reaching 90 %
adoptions or follow a different trend (Figs. 1d, 2d). Even when the curves look
similar, the presence of management does not seem to affect the end result. This
may be due to the fact that managers of larger organizations are not immune from
fads and they are actually more exposed to them (e.g., Abrahamson 1991, 2011; Fiol
and O’Connor 2003). When this ‘‘exposure’’ happens, it is more likely that other
employees will pick them up in a way similar to inter-organization diffusion
processes. Why is this phenomenon related to larger organizations? One explanation
may be found in the social relationships that are not so strong and people are more
likely to lean on imitation (Strang and Meyer 1993). Indirect relationships (i.e.,
weak ties Granovetter 1973) can be related to lack of communication, difficulty of
mutual understanding, and more passive than active advice giving and taking
(Secchi 2011). This may be linked to more imitative behavior on the part of the
worker. The phenomenon is likely to increase even more whenever ambiguity is
high (usually this is the case when comparing small vs large organizations) and
culture is more static and imitation-based.
Proposition 3 Managers increase the likelihood of bandwagons in large
organizations when cultural conformity is identifiable and when the range of
interaction among workers is limited.
Some of the simulation results may appear more clearly looking into the network
structures to understand the origination points of the diffusion process. The
simulation used a random allocation of thresholds to employees and management,
giving an even probability for anyone in the organization to start the bandwagon, be
in proximity of others, and move around (in the high ambiguity condition).
However, given the higher influence of management, the fact that they are or are not
in the bandwagon may reflect significantly to the behavior of the other agents. This
implies that analyzing the structure of the network and identifying its evolution may
bring in some more insights on results presented in this paper. As already shown in
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other studies (e.g., Abrahamson and Rosenkopf 1997; Eguı´luz et al. 2005), this is an
extremely relevant point and we invite readers to investigate it with our model.4
However, in a randomized allocation, the probability that management would or
would not be the origination point of—as well as the probability that management
would get involved or not involved in—bandwagons are even. On average,
independent of the active or passive role of management, the presence of hierarchy
affects the emergence and evolution of bandwagons. This is why, although
important and interesting, we do not deem there is enough scope to dig into this
aspect in the current paper. Although the structure of networks was not within the
scope of the current paper, we plan on conducting a follow up study that tackles
with this extremely relevant issue.
5.3 The impact of cultural conformity
To further discuss the point in the last proposition, this subsection deals with what
we labelled K to represent organizational cultural conformity. Computational and
theoretical models simplify real-life phenomena and emphasize only some rather
specific aspects (Gilbert and Troitzsch 2005). Although with ABMs it can be argued
otherwise (i.e., there are examples of highly descriptive simulations, Edmonds and
Moss 2005), the model we present here is no exception (Gilbert and Terna 2000).
This is particularly true for the way we modeled culture. As already stated above,
we have decided to highlight the shared basis that every culture seem to have as it
sets a common ground for agents’ behavior (Strang 1991).
The logic behind the model sets a rule for behavior and passive exchange of
information (the low docility and low exploitation of distributed cognition
mechanisms) that is common and shared among simulated employees in the
organization. This affects significantly affects bandwagons probability (hazard rate),
and its effects become stronger with the increasing organization size. This may be
related to the number of people involved in a larger organization and to the fact that
social relations become weaker with the increasing structures and complexity of
large organizations. It is safe to state that a culture increasingly based on imitation
or conformity (K ¼ 1) is more likely to bring bandwagons up. Figures 1, 2, 3 and 4
show cumulative events curves and compares different organization sizes, both
when ambiguity is widespread and when it is not. They also show that, for larger
organizations, resistance to bandwagons goes down significantly as time goes by. At
time T ¼ 100, there is little probability of getting ‘‘immunity’’ to bandwagons.
Proposition 4 Stronger as opposed to weaker cultural conformity increases the
spread of bandwagons. The effect is more effective in larger organizations when
ambiguity is low.
Low ambiguity opens the ground for individuals to lean on each other more
often, and this is probably why the effect is larger under these conditions. Also, it is
not surprising that large organizations are affected more widely by conformity since
4 The model is available on the platform OpenABM (https://www.openabm.org/model/4716/version/1,
Secchi 2015c).
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the perception of culture can differ among diverse aggregations of local agents.
These centers may be regarded as ‘‘change agents’’ (Strang and Soule 1998).
Also, and surprisingly, these effects do not change significantly when we add
ambiguity to the simulation. This implies that organizational culture or shared
behavioral patterns that emerge from cognitive similarities of agents—a sort of
imitation mindset—is a very powerful source of bandwagons (and this confirms
previous neo-institutional hypotheses such as in, Strang and Meyer 1993), but it is
partially opposite to other assumptions (e.g., Carley 1995). Ambiguity is not enough
to overcome a strong culture, meaning that certainty, represented by culture, is
always preferred to highest uncertainty, represented by ambiguity in our model.
Moreover, the larger the organizations, the more individuals decrease the impact of
ambiguity on their decision making to find their role in organizational dynamics. In
short, our findings support previous research on the influence of institutional
variables in the workplace (e.g., Colquitt et al. 2002).
5.4 Strong ties and bandwagons
The parameter social relationships or ‘‘proximity’’ v has a stable impact on
bandwagons. A common factor among all organizations can be seen from Figs. 5
and 6, where it becomes apparent that the absence of cultural conformity increases
dramatically the probability of bandwagons. This may be counterintuitive and
requires further specifications. The presence of culture should allow people to build
stronger ties, because they share values, principles, norms, a common environment,
and more (in the sense of, Granovetter 1973). However, in the way we have
modeled it, cultural conformity K has a rather weak effect on social ties because it
operates superficially, on the basis of imitation and not of substantial interaction
among agents. Hence, we posit that K is a source of weak rather than strong ties.
Instead, the individual attitude to make decisions based on shared information
through social channels (i.e., docility k) is likely to generate strong ties, because it
creates the conditions for more in-depth social relationships between employees
(and management). For this reason, docility is connected to generating strong ties
(or ties stronger than in the cultural conformity condition) and these, in turn, lead to
an increase of bandwagons. This can be justified by the fact that organizations
where an increase in social relationships is quicker than a culture to emerge, may
see employees moving together to create that shared culture. In this sense,
bandwagons (i.e., moving or sticking together) may be seen as a surrogate of
culture:
Proposition 5 When agents are let free to interact on the basis of their docile
attitudes only (and cultural conformity is absent) bandwagons are more likely to
emerge. The effect increases with organization size.
There is one nuance in the way social relationships affect the spread of
bandwagons that relates to large organizations. When large organizations are
considered under low ambiguity, it may well be that the impact of social
relationships is limited by other parameters/factors. However, when we look at
Fig. 5c, d we may realize that the presence of minimal level of social relationships
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(v ¼ 4) already brings the organizations to a situation where there is high
occurrence of bandwagons. Modifications do not improve or deteriorate what is
already particularly critical.
Simulated employees and managers are characterized by ‘‘docility.’’ This is the
tendency to make decisions using social cognitive resources that are external to
one’s brain (Simon 1993; Knudsen 2003). The mechanisms of threshold adaptation
have been modeled according to this human attitude. When employees are left
without a clear rule for organizational cultural conformity (i.e., K = 0), it is the
distribution of passive docility that spreads and leads to bandwagons more often
(Figs. 5, 6). The absence of culture—even if the one aspect that is represented in the
simulation is ‘‘conformity’’—leads individuals to lean on what is called passive (i.e.,
take-only) docile attitudes (Secchi and Bardone 2009, 2013). The mechanism
underlying this phenomenon can be explained with the type of organization that
shows no conformity rule. We identified these organizations above as being subject
to crisis, start-ups, newly established subsidiaries in foreign countries. There are two
hypotheses on how the passive distributed cognitive mechanisms affect bandwagons
especially in large organizations. One is that particularly low levels of docility may
be associated with a complete passive (or take-only) behavior that is a cheap
cognitive mechanism. Imitation can be a successful survival strategy although it can
also be associated with what Simon (1993) labelled ‘‘unintelligent’’ docile
individuals or with ‘‘selfish’’ non-docile behavior. Both aspects are likely to appear
more often when there is no common glue that keeps employees together. In the
model, this is mild cultural conformity. In short, it seems that more active (Bardone
2011) and ‘‘intelligent’’ (Simon 1993) distributed cognitive processes are successful
when there is a feeling of belongingness and a community to which employees can
identify with (Secchi and Bardone 2009). This element needs to be investigated
further however, we have isolated some of the aspects that characterized more
clearly what is this ‘‘mindlessness’’ that previous works on the bandwagon refer to
(Fiol and O’Connor 2003; Secchi and Bardone 2013).
5.5 Limitations and conclusion
There are a few limitations of this study. First, organization structures are not
composed of two hierarchical levels, employees and managers. There is a chain of
command that is not represented in the model. Moreover, there is a need to better
specify what makes the difference between these two levels in terms of decision
making and influence. The model is only a first approximation to the complexity of
social relationships. Second, culture is modeled through easiness of imitation that
may cover some aspects of it, but it certainly does not make justice of the many
significant elements defining organizational culture. Once again, the model is
designed to isolate what is relevant to bandwagon processes; hence a more complex
representation may not turn out to be beneficial. However, it may be a topic for
future modifications of this model. An aspect related to this element that can be
studied in future research is that of the interaction between a broader concept of
culture and bandwagon. Our results suggest that there may be some limited overlap,
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under certain conditions. Further research is needed to clarify what exactly the
relationship is.
A third limitation is that better fine tuning may be needed to model ambiguity.
We defined it as agents that move randomly on a three-dimensional space that
represents the organization so that it is a component of the way agents perceive their
surroundings, thus affecting their bounded rationality. This simple approximation to
ambiguity may be remodeled to include other stochastic components that affect all
relevant parameters of the model. This one, again, can be a development for future
research although one of the pros of using ABMs is that they are used to model
complex emerging problems. Having stated this, we believe a more specific and
detailed account of ambiguity can be modeled.
The paper presents a multi-agent model that predicts the likelihood of employees
of small and large organizations to join bandwagons. To study the phenomenon,
simulation data were generated with threshold levels that let agents adapt to the
social environment approximated by organizational culture, proximity, ambiguity,
docility, and management-employee relations. Findings show that bandwagons do
not depend strictly on the distribution of thresholds in as much as they are affected
by strong organizational culture and management-employee relations. Impact of
organizational variables also vary with size.
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Appendix
While figures provide a clean representation of our results, statistics support those
representations and detail the size of the various effects discussed in the text. We
regressed the probability of joining a bandwagon using Cox proportional-hazards
regression models (Cox 1972). This statistical technique allows us to estimate the
probability for agents to join the bandwagon (i.e., hazard rate), comparing two or
more covariates. Tables 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 below are numerical representations of
Figs. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6.
With very few exceptions, results were highly significant mostly because of the
large number of observations (reported in the tables with the letter n). The following
tables present the exponentiated regression coefficients, their p values, 95 %
confidence intervals, the log-likelihood, and a likelihood-ratio test for goodness-of-
fit. The exponentiated coefficients have a direct multiplicative effect on the hazard
rate (HR); e.g., a coefficient of 1.227 for one covariate (Table 2, Model 1, K ¼ 0:5)
has 22.7 % influence on the HR when holding the other covariates constant. The
value is relative to the baseline case (K ¼ 0:1), so that, when our b is 1.227 for
K ¼ 0:5, the impact on HR is 22.7 % higher than the baseline case. All the models
have been run independently, so that the first value (baseline) is set as the
benchmark and the other values show an increased (exp(coef) [ 1:00) or a
decreased likelihood to join the bandwagon (exp(coef) \1:00).
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Table 2 Cox proportional hazards regressions for bandwagon affected by conformity K and proximity v
Small org. (N = 100)
Model 1 (v = 4) Model 2 (v = 5) Model 3 (v = 6)
exp(coef) exp(coef) exp(coef)
(.95 Conf. Int.) (.95 Conf. Int.) (.95 Conf. Int.)
K = 0.5/0.1 1.227* 1.443*** 1.710***
(1.009, 1.491) (1.234, 1.688) (1.479, 1.978)
K = 1/0.1 1.291** 1.603*** 2.176***
(1.065, 1.566) (1.374, 1.869) (1.891, 2.505)
Log-likelihood -6664.944 -10777.127 -13562.030
Likelihood ratio test 7.48* 39.87*** 127.6***
Mid-sized org. (N = 200)
Model 4 (v = 4) Model 5 (v = 5) Model 6 (v = 6)
exp(coef) exp(coef) exp(coef)
(.95 Conf. Int.) (.95 Conf. Int.) (.95 Conf. Int.)
K = 0.5/0.1 1.596*** 2.286*** 4.520***
(1.424, 1.789) (2.055, 2.542) (4.030, 5.069)
K = 1/0.1 1.649*** 2.949*** 6.578***
(1.471, 1.848) (2.659, 3.270) (5.880, 7.358)
Log-likelihood -20,211.744 -28,126.775 -34,267.037
Likelihood ratio test 93.08*** 494.4*** 1570.0***
Mid-sized org. (N = 500)
Model 7 (v = 4) Model 8 (v = 5) Model 9 (v = 6)
exp(coef) exp(coef) exp(coef)
(.95 Conf. Int.) (.95 Conf. Int.) (.95 Conf. Int.)
K = 0.5/0.1 3.392*** 11.82*** 44.45***
(3.145, 3.660) (10.770, 12.98) (38.54, 51.25)
K = 1/0.1 4.077*** 15.58*** 72.02***
(3.784, 4.394) (14.18, 17.11) (62.29, 83.26)
Log-likelihood -64,666.14 -81,593.37 -52,490.53
Likelihood ratio test 1841.0*** 6826.0*** 10,527.0***
Large org. (N = 1000)
Model 10 (v = 4) Model 11 (v = 5) Model 12 (v = 6)
exp(coef) exp(coef) exp(coef)
(.95 Conf. Int.) (.95 Conf. Int.) (.95 Conf. Int.)
K = 0.5/0.1 13.99*** 65.93*** 505.7***
(12.92, 15.15) (57.34, 75.81) (387.9, 659.2)
K = 1/0.1 17.05*** 99.72*** 17,542.4***
(15.73, 18.48) (86.54, 114.90) (13,118.6, 23,457.9)
Log-likelihood -12,4584.38 -64,043.57 -27,114.49
Likelihood ratio test 10,825.0*** 14,866.0*** 17,133.0***
Note: exp(coef) exponential of the coefficient, Conf. Int. confidence interval; n = 45,150
Sig. codes: *** p\.001; ** p\.01; ** p\.05;  p\0:10
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Table 3 Cox proportional hazards regressions for bandwagon affected by conformity K, proximity v, and
ambiguity
Small org. (N = 100)
Model 1 (v = 4) Model 2 (v = 5) Model 3 (v = 6)
exp(coef) exp(coef) exp(coef)
(.95 Conf. Int.) (.95 Conf. Int.) (.95 Conf. Int.)
K = 0.5/0.1 1.588*** 2.155*** 4.833***
(1.362, 1.852) (1.846, 2.517) (4.076, 5.731)
K = 1/0.1 1.673*** 2.548*** 6.717***
(1.436, 1.948) (2.190, 2.964) (5.688, 7.932)
Log-likelihood -10,882.79 -12,046.09 -12,266.83
Likelihood ratio test 53.24*** 174.4*** 705.2***
n 45,150 45,150 43,976
Mid-sized org. (N = 200)
Model 4 (v = 4) Model 5 (v = 5) Model 6 (v = 6)
exp(coef) exp(coef) exp(coef)
(.95 Conf. Int.) (.95 Conf. Int.) (.95 Conf. Int.)
K = 0.5/0.1 3.053*** 6.746*** 19.83***
(2.706, 3.443) (5.785, 7.867) (16.01, 24.57)
K = 1/0.1 3.678*** 10.221*** 38.00***
(3.269, 4.137) (8.793, 11.880) (30.73, 46.98)
Log-likelihood -22,755.60 -19,151.88 -12,316.02
Likelihood ratio test 609.8*** 1449.0*** 2293.0***
n 45,150 44,997 34,831
Mid-sized org. (N = 500)
Model 7 (v = 4) Model 8 (v = 5) Model 9 (v = 6)
exp(coef) exp(coef) exp(coef)
(.95 Conf. Int.) (.95 Conf. Int.) (.95 Conf. Int.)
K = 0.5/0.1 7.115*** 30.51*** 71.56***
(6.385, 7.929) (24.77, 37.59) (53.14, 96.36)
K = 1/0.1 11.138*** 80.78*** 434.78***
(10.020, 12.380) (65.74, 99.27) (321.80, 587.44)
Log-likelihood -38,841.302 -19,576.512 -9084.534
Likelihood ratio test 3186.0*** 1976.0*** 4042.0***
n 45,150 36,973 26,181
Large org. (N = 1000)
Model 10 (v = 4) Model 11 (v = 5) Model 12 (v = 6)
exp(coef) exp(coef) exp(coef)
(.95 Conf. Int.) (.95 Conf. Int.) (.95 Conf. Int.)
K = 0.5/0.1 25.00*** 75.28*** 124.4***
(21.73, 28.75) (56.84, 99.72) (89.78, 172.5)
K = 1/0.1 67.68*** 514.53*** 1537.6***
(58.86, 77.83) (388.20, 681.97) (1106.50, 2136.8)
Log-likelihood -39,400.033 -15,014.340 -6895.439
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Table 3 continued
Large org. (N = 1000)
Model 10 (v = 4) Model 11 (v = 5) Model 12 (v = 6)
exp(coef) exp(coef) exp(coef)
(.95 Conf. Int.) (.95 Conf. Int.) (.95 Conf. Int.)
Likelihood ratio test 8394.0*** 6277.0*** 4514.0***
n 40,794 31,205 23,858
Note: exp(coef) exponential of the coefficient, Conf. Int. confidence interval
Sig. codes: *** p\.001; ** p\.01; ** p\.05;  p\0:10
Table 4 Cox proportional hazards regressions for bandwagon affected by conformity K, proximity v and
hierarchy
Small org. (N = 100)
Model 1 (v = 4) Model 2 (v = 5) Model 3 (v = 6)
exp(coef) exp(coef) exp(coef)
(.95 Conf. Int.) (.95 Conf. Int.) (.95 Conf. Int.)
K = 0.5/0.1 1.022 1.571*** 1.694***
(0.8409, 1.243) (1.330, 1.856) (1.448, 1.982)
K = 1/0.1 1.192 1.703*** 1.902***
(0.9864, 1.440) (1.445, 2.008) (1.629, 2.220)
Log-likelihood -6600.811 -9758.798 -11,167.656
Likelihood ratio test 3.96 (n.s.) 46.89*** 76.3***
n 45,150 45,150 45,150
Mid-sized org. (N = 200)
Model 4 (v = 4) Model 5 (v = 5) Model 6 (v = 6)
exp(coef) exp(coef) exp(coef)
(.95 Conf. Int.) (.95 Conf. Int.) (.95 Conf. Int.)
K = 0.5/0.1 1.259*** 1.621*** 1.768***
(1.116, 1.420) (1.447, 1.817) (1.566, 1.997)
K = 1/0.1 1.419*** 1.857*** 2.041***
(1.261, 1.597) (1.660, 2.077) (1.811, 2.299)
Log-likelihood -17,570.78 -20,885.71 -18,922.86
Likelihood ratio test 34.99*** 131.0*** 156.4***
n 45,150 45,150 45,150
Mid-sized org. (N = 500)
Model 7 (v = 4) Model 8 (v = 5) Model 9 (v = 6)
exp(coef) exp(coef) exp(coef)
(.95 Conf. Int.) (.95 Conf. Int.) (.95 Conf. Int.)
K = 0.5/0.1 1.938*** 1.830*** 2.396***
(1.793, 2.095) (1.690, 1.982) (2.232, 2.573)
K = 1/0.1 2.067*** 2.254*** 3.308***
(1.913, 2.233) (2.085, 2.436) (3.085, 3.548)
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Table 4 continued
Mid-sized org. (N = 500)
Model 7 (v = 4) Model 8 (v = 5) Model 9 (v = 6)
exp(coef) exp(coef) exp(coef)
(.95 Conf. Int.) (.95 Conf. Int.) (.95 Conf. Int.)
Log-likelihood -46,085.03 -44,134.82 -59,807.74
Likelihood ratio test 424.8*** 469.1*** 1317.0***
n 45,150 45,150 44,936
Large org. (N = 1000)
Model 10 (v = 4) Model 11 (v = 5) Model 12 (v = 6)
exp(coef) exp(coef) exp(coef)
(.95 Conf. Int.) (.95 Conf. Int.) (.95 Conf. Int.)
K = 0.5/0.1 1.874*** 2.799*** 5.369***
(1.768, 1.986) (2.635, 2.973) (5.036, 5.725)
K = 1/0.1 2.245*** 4.781*** 14.552***
(2.121, 2.376) (4.508, 5.070) (13.619, 15.549)
Log-likelihood -82,892.32 -94,334.35 -89,398.69
Likelihood ratio test 883.8*** 3332.0*** 8301.0***
n 45,150 44,761 38,773
Note: exp(coef) exponential of the coefficient, Conf. Int. confidence interval
Sig. codes: *** p\.001; ** p\.01; ** p\.05;  p\0:10
Table 5 Cox proportional hazards regressions for bandwagon affected by conformity K, proximity v,
hierarchy, and ambiguity
Small org. (N = 100)
Model 1 (v = 4) Model 2 (v = 5) Model 3 (v = 6)
exp(coef) exp(coef) exp(coef)
(.95 Conf. Int.) (.95 Conf. Int.) (.95 Conf. Int.)
K = 0.5/0.1 1.329 1.612*** 1.147*
(1.139, 1.550) (1.405, 1.849) (1.001, 1.315)
K = 1/0.1 1.473*** 1.695*** 1.843***
(1.267, 1.713) (1.479, 1.943) (1.626, 2.089)
Log-likelihood -10,743.50 -14,034.88 -15,246.11
Likelihood ratio test 27.17*** 70.31*** 108.6***
n 45,150 45,150 45,150
Mid-sized org. (N = 200)
Model 4 (v = 4) Model 5 (v = 5) Model 6 (v = 6)
exp(coef) exp(coef) exp(coef)
(.95 Conf. Int.) (.95 Conf. Int.) (.95 Conf. Int.)
K = 0.5/0.1 1.338*** 1.349*** 1.790***
(1.214, 1.476) (1.225, 1.486) (1.618, 1.980)
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Table 5 continued
Mid-sized org. (N = 200)
Model 4 (v = 4) Model 5 (v = 5) Model 6 (v = 6)
exp(coef) exp(coef) exp(coef)
(.95 Conf. Int.) (.95 Conf. Int.) (.95 Conf. Int.)
K = 1/0.1 1.570*** 1.606*** 2.472***
(1.428, 1.727) (1.463, 1.764) (2.242, 2.725)
Log-likelihood -27,128.06 -28,155.60 -26,802.09
Likelihood ratio test 90.14*** 102.3*** 354.4***
n 45,150 45,150 42,639
Mid-sized org. (N = 500)
Model 7 (v = 4) Model 8 (v = 5) Model 9 (v = 6)
exp(coef) exp(coef) exp(coef)
(.95 Conf. Int.) (.95 Conf. Int.) (.95 Conf. Int.)
K = 0.5/0.1 1.533*** 2.434*** 7.451***
(1.439, 1.633) (2.267, 2.614) (6.745, 8.231)
K = 1/0.1 1.378*** 2.216*** 8.093***
(1.292, 1.470) (2.061, 2.383) (7.322, 8.946)
Log-likelihood -61,248.51 -52,141.18 -33,624.70
Likelihood ratio test 189.7*** 752.3*** 2713.0***
n 45,150 45,009 32,279
Large org. (N = 1000)
Model 10 (v = 4) Model 11 (v = 5) Model 12 (v = 6)
exp(coef) exp(coef) exp(coef)
(.95 Conf. Int.) (.95 Conf. Int.) (.95 Conf. Int.)
K = 0.5/0.1 1.740*** 6.367*** 4.07***
(1.650, 1.835) (5.879, 6.896) (3.633, 4.56)
K = 1/0.1 1.829*** 8.358*** 15.71***
(1.735, 1.929) (7.718, 9.051) (14.092, 17.50)
Log-likelihood -88,961.38 -58,598.09 -25,447.53
Likelihood ratio test 626.6*** 4135.0*** 3005.0***
n 45,150 44,761 29,771
Note: exp(coef) exponential of the coefficient, Conf. Int. confidence interval
Sig. codes: *** p\.001; ** p\.01; ** p\.05;  p\0:10
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Table 6 Cox proportional hazards regressions for bandwagon affected by docility k, proximity v, and
hierarchy
Small org. (N = 100)
Model 1 (v = 4) Model 2 (v = 5) Model 3 (v = 6)
exp(coef) exp(coef) exp(coef)
(.95 Conf. Int.) (.95 Conf. Int.) (.95 Conf. Int.)
Hierarchy 0.874 0.787*** 0.510***
(0.731, 1.044) (0.6867, 0.903) (0.457, 0.568)
Log-likelihood -4377.752 -7307.699 -11824.570
Likelihood ratio test 2.22 (n.s.) 11.76*** 152.9***
n 10,100 10,100 10,100
Mid-sized org. (N = 200)
Model 4 (v = 4) Model 5 (v = 5) Model 6 (v = 6)
exp(coef) exp(coef) exp(coef)
(.95 Conf. Int.) (.95 Conf. Int.) (.95 Conf. Int.)
Hierarchy 0.792*** 0.599*** 0.505***
(0.715, 0.876) (0.554, 0.647) (0.470, 0.544)
Log-likelihood -13,158.14 -22,357.51 -23,685.40
Likelihood ratio test 20.47*** 172.9*** 334.4***
n 10,100 10,100 10,100
Mid-sized org. (N = 500)
Model 7 (v = 4) Model 8 (v = 5) Model 9 (v = 6)
exp(coef) exp(coef) exp(coef)
(.95 Conf. Int.) (.95 Conf. Int.) (.95 Conf. Int.)
Hierarchy 0.651*** 0.469*** 0.174***
(0.615, 0.690) (0.438, 0.502) (0.159, 0.190)
Log-likelihood -37,553.79 -27,871.37 -21,101.38
Likelihood ratio test 211.4*** 443.8*** 1152.0***
n 10,100 9877 7171
Large org. (N = 1000)
Model 10 (v = 4) Model 11 (v = 5) Model 12 (v = 6)
exp(coef) exp(coef) exp(coef)
(.95 Conf. Int.) (.95 Conf. Int.) (.95 Conf. Int.)
Hierarchy 0.524*** 0.168*** 0.143***
(0.491, 0.558) (0.153, 0.184) (0.128, 0.159)
Log-likelihood -32,933.74 -25,667.22 -23,364.73
Likelihood ratio test 368.8*** 1157.0*** 970.0***
n 9867 7056 6490
Note: exp(coef) exponential of the coefficient, Conf. Int. confidence interval
Sig. codes: *** p\.001; ** p\.01; ** p\.05;  p\0:10
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Table 7 Cox proportional hazards regressions for bandwagon affected by docility k, proximity v,
hierarchy, and ambiguity
Small org. (N = 100)
Model 1 (v = 4) Model 2 (v = 5) Model 3 (v = 6)
exp(coef) exp(coef) exp(coef)
(.95 Conf. Int.) (.95 Conf. Int.) (.95 Conf. Int.)
Hierarchy 1.043 0.703*** 0.640***
(0.897, 1.212) (0.625, 0.791) (0.580, 0.706)
Log-likelihood -5962.765 -9783.699 -13,400.484
Likelihood ratio test 0.3 (n.s.) 34.81*** 79.0***
n 10,100 10,100 10,100
Mid-sized org. (N = 200)
Model 4 (v = 4) Model 5 (v = 5) Model 6 (v = 6)
exp(coef) exp(coef) exp(coef)
(.95 Conf. Int.) (.95 Conf. Int.) (.95 Conf. Int.)
Hierarchy 0.742*** 0.722*** 0.39***
(0.683, 0.806) (0.670, 0.777) (0.358, 0.425)
Log-likelihood -19,404.53 -23,192.75 -17,247.23
Likelihood ratio test 50.75*** 73.82*** 432.4***
n 10,100 10,100 8992
Mid-sized org. (N = 500)
Model 7 (v = 4) Model 8 (v = 5) Model 9 (v = 6)
exp(coef) exp(coef) exp(coef)
(.95 Conf. Int.) (.95 Conf. Int.) (.95 Conf. Int.)
Hierarchy 0.669*** 0.308*** 0.141***
(0.630, 0.710) (0.285, 0.334) (0.126, 0.158)
Log-likelihood -34,532.53 -22,436.44 -15,463.53
Likelihood ratio test 168.5*** 717.7*** 914.2***
n 10,100 7828 5816
Large org. (N = 1000)
Model 10 (v = 4) Model 11 (v = 5) Model 12 (v = 6)
exp(coef) exp(coef) exp(coef)
(.95 Conf. Int.) (.95 Conf. Int.) (.95 Conf. Int.)
Hierarchy 0.354*** 0.156*** 0.193***
(0.329, 0.380) (0.139, 0.174) (0.169, 0.219)
Log-likelihood -29,626.58 -18,957.91 -11,569.03
Likelihood ratio test 676.9*** 884.9*** 530.2***
n 8446 6117 4362
Note: exp(coef) exponential of the coefficient, Conf. Int. confidence interval
Sig. codes: *** p\.001; ** p\.01; ** p\.05;  p\0:10
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